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COMMENT
Sheltering Deprivations: FEMA, Section 408 Housing,
and Procedural Redesign
Having weathered nearly two years of unprecedented disasters and
unrelenting public criticism, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is the most indispensable - and most distrusted - pillar of the nation's
emergency management infrastructure. A constellation of well-documented
failures, mostly in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, has created an image of an
agency adrift. Yet FEMA's role in the Gulf Coast recovery effort has only
intensified; the agency is now responsible for sheltering over a million disaster
survivors.
Section 408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act ("Stafford Act")' forms the core of the federal government's
emergency housing regime. The provision guarantees up to eighteen months
of housing benefits for all disaster survivors -regardless of their means-who
can demonstrate substantial damage to their primary residence.2 As the agency
charged with administering this program, FEMA has earned stinging rebukes
from survivors and lawmakers for erroneously denying thousands of
meritorious housing requests while paying out millions of dollars in fraudulent
claims.' FEMA's mistakes are in part the product of two mutually reinforcing
1. 42 U.S.C. § 5121-5206 (2000).
a. This eighteen-month deadline can, however, be extended at FEMA's discretion if "due to
extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the public interest." Federal
Assistance to Individuals and Households, 44 C.F.R. § 2o6.no(e) (2006). Indeed, FEMA
recently bowed to public pressure and extended the duration of housing benefits for Katrina
survivors. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Housing Aid Extended for 'o5 Storm Victims, WASH. POST,
Jan. 20, 2007, at A2; Editorial, Nowhere To Turn for Shelter, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 2007, at
A22.
3. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA:
UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES EXPOSED THE INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM TO
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factors. First, the agency's organizational structure relies heavily on a
combination of contract and temporary employees to conduct housing
inspections that determine benefit eligibility.4 Second, with survivors scattered
across the country and unable to attend FEMA inspections, many claimants
have been forced to rely on FEMA's sometimes cursory, and potentially
erroneous, ex parte conclusions.
FEMA has also proven incapable of communicating the reasons underlying
its eligibility determinations. Unable to decipher the grounds for benefit
denials, some hurricane survivors with valid claims have failed to take
advantage of FEMA's appeals process.' And although a dedicated cadre of
volunteer lawyers has helped survivors navigate the section 408 process, its
ranks are limited and its time spread thinly among the myriad legal issues
associated with Hurricane Katrina.6
FEMA's recent troubles foreshadow what will likely occur when future
catastrophes, natural or man-made, stretch the agency's capacity and thrust
countless citizens into the unfamiliar role of government dependents. In
response, administrative law scholars should consider ways to insulate this
unique class of beneficiaries from the consequences of agency failure.
After describing the section 4o8 program in Part I, this Comment offers
two positive procedural reforms to reduce the incidence of erroneous
emergency housing deprivations. The first proposal, outlined in Part II, calls
on FEMA to grant an in-person hearing to any section 408 claimant who
wishes to challenge the agency's eligibility determination. The second
proposal, presented in Part III, seeks to make this adjudicatory process more
effective and to further reduce agency error by awarding attorney's fees for
successful section 408 appeals. I conclude by asking Congress-which is led by
FRAUD AND ABUSE; ACTIONS NEEDED To REDUCE SUCH PROBLEMS IN FUTURE 4 (2oo6),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6lo 13.pdf.
4. See id. at 9. These workers are often poorly trained to conduct inspections. See id. at 4.
s. See Minority Staff of the House Fin. Servs. Comm., Meeting Housing Needs Arising out of
Hurricane Katrina: A Status Report One Year Later (Aug. 24, 20o6), http://financialservices.
house.gov/KatrinaHousingReport.html ("[A] significant number of families in financial
need simply dropped out of the program, due to factors such as FEMA's administrative
incompetence, the difficulty in dealing with FEMA, and/or the failure to have any
confidence that they are still eligible for assistance.").
6. See Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery
Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 36-37 (2006).
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some of section 4o8's fiercest critics' - to amend the Stafford Act to incorporate
these procedural redesign proposals.
I. THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 408 HOUSING
Shuffled from makeshift camps to hotels and motels and finally to mobile
homes and subsidized apartments, Katrina survivors have endured a long road
toward normalcy-one made more difficult by FEMA's inadequate
administration of section 408. This Part briefly describes the standard process
used to determine emergency housing eligibility and the problems FEMA
experienced in meeting its statutory mandate after Katrina.
To qualify for section 4o8 assistance, an applicant must: (i) have incurred
uninsured (or underinsured) damage in a federally declared disaster area; (2)
be a citizen or legal resident of the United States; (3) have resided in the
damaged home at the time of the disaster; and, most critically, (4) be unable to
access or live in the home because of disaster damage.8 Once an applicant
contacts FEMA for assistance, the agency arranges for one of its contract or
temporary employees (who often operate out of FEMA's Disaster Recovery
Centers) to meet with the survivor at her home and to perform an inspection to
determine the extent of damage.9 If, after inspection, an applicant is accepted
into the program, she receives a check from FEMA covering the cost of either
an apartment or a mobile home. The agency also requires a beneficiary
periodically to recertify her "continuing need"'° -presumably an antifraud
mechanism designed to ensure that disbursed funds are not being used for
nonhousing expenditures. If rejected, an applicant must be told the grounds
for the denial and can appeal the decision by writing a letter to the agency
stating why she thinks the decision is incorrect." FEMA then reconsiders the
application before making a final determination.
7. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Barney Frank et al. to Michael Chertoff, Sec'y of the Dep't of
Homeland Sec. (Feb. 3, 20o6), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/pro2o32o6.html
(protesting the inadequate administration of section 4o8).
8. See Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, 44 C.F.R. S 2o6.11o (2006); U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 57.
9. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at lo-i .
1o. Id. at 65.
11. See FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER: AN APPLICANT'S GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALS &
HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 10-11 (2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/assistance/
process/help-after disaster-english.pdf; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 5189a(c) (2000) (authorizing the
executive to "issue rules which provide for the fair and impartial consideration of appeals").
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In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the application process was beset with
severe confusion and repeated accusations of erroneous housing denials. 2
FEMA was twice haled into federal court for failing to provide adequate notice
of the grounds for its housing determinations. 3 The agency also had
considerable difficulty adjusting to the human displacement caused by the
disaster.' 4 Specifically, because Katrina scattered victims across the country,
many applicants were unable to return to their homes to accompany FEMA
employees during the inspection process." Without the applicant or her
designated agent present, FEMA could only inspect the exterior of the house,
thus remaining ignorant of any interior damage.' 6 While it is impossible to
determine the precise rate of agency error, one report tracing FEMA's section
408 stewardship documented a 50% error rate in a sample of approximately
12,ooo housing denials.1 7
Anecdotal evidence from section 408 claimants paints an equally sobering
picture. Some survivors have complained that FEMA has cancelled scheduled
inspections, adding to the time applicants must wait to transition into stable
housing.s Others have noted FEMA's curious, but seemingly widespread,
pattern of denying housing damage in areas that the agency's own geospatial
mapping showed to be entirely uninhabitable. 9
Charitably put, FEMA has been underperforming. The agency's post-
Katrina record demonstrates a troubling gap between its actual administration
of section 4o8 and its duty to distribute housing benefits fairly to those in need
12. To manage the unexpected demands placed on it by Hurricane Katrina, the agency first
relied on local governments and private organizations to provide stopgap housing and later
reimbursed them for doing so. This intermediate step was funded by section 403 of the
Stafford Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 517ob, and allowed survivors to obtain federally funded shelter
without first having to establish their eligibility under section 408, see U.S. GOV'T
AccouNTABaITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 26-27 (noting that delays were avoided by
resorting to section 403).
13. See Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.
2006); McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. La. 20o6).
14. See Hooks & Miller, supra note 6 (chronicling anecdotal evidence from disaster survivors).
15. To complete a breathtaking 1.9 million inspections for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
agency relied on alternative forms of damage verification, including geospatial mapping and
satellite images, to estimate the amount of flooding in particular areas of Louisiana and
Mississippi. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 19 & n.21.
16. See id. at 24 tbl.4.
17. See Hurricane Katrina Project, Appleseed, Houston City Report 26 (20o6),
http://www.appleseeds.net/servlet/GetArticleFile?articleFileld=239.
18. See Hooks & Miller, supra note 6, at 68-69.
ig. See id. at 67; Hurricane Katrina Project, supra note 17, at 26.
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after a catastrophic event. Although Congress has unveiled a series of structural
reforms to reorganize the agency,2" the existing policy agenda sweeps too
broadly (and at great cost) while neglecting the implementation failures
described above. Instead of reflexively opting for far-reaching agency
reorganization, policymakers should consider a few carefully crafted and
minimally invasive procedural reforms that may reduce erroneous housing
deprivations more quickly and efficiently.
II. DISPLACEMENT, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND DIGNITY: THE CASE FOR
DEPRIVATION HEARINGS
From initial application to final appeal, the existing section 408 procedures
provide few safeguards to prevent agency error. This Part focuses on
redesigning the administrative appeals process to reduce the incidence of
erroneous housing deprivations. Specifically, the Stafford Act should be
amended to provide section 408 claimants the right to an in-person hearing to
contest their eligibility status. Such deprivation hearings need not incorporate a
full bundle of trial-type procedural rights.2" The hearings should, however,
provide the right to present evidence, including oral testimony, in front of an
impartial administrative judge who will make a final-and judicially
unreviewable- determination on the basis of the evidence presented.
Additionally, the hearings should be conducted at a time and place reasonably
convenient for the claimant. 3
Three considerations -each evident in the aftermath of Katrina but not
necessarily unique to it-would support an enhanced appeals regime that
includes deprivation hearings. First, the physical displacement that attends
events causing mass devastation puts survivors at a distinct disadvantage in
rebutting FEMA's initial damage assessment. Under the current process,
displaced survivors have trouble marshaling physical evidence of disaster
2o. See generally KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
POLICY CHANGES AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(2oo6), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33729.pdf (discussing
congressional reform measures).
21. Indeed, I am mindful of the diminishing marginal utility of additional procedures.
22. Given the program's eighteen-month duration, adding judicial review would undermine
prompt claim resolution.
23. To be clear, I base my arguments on what would make the best policy, not on what might
be the constitutional minimum under prevailing procedural due process doctrine. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This approach undoubtedly strikes a balance that
is more favorable to the claimant.
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damage to demonstrate their section 408 eligibility. A deprivation hearing with
the possibility of oral testimony would alleviate this evidentiary deficit,
animating an appeal in ways that a sterile letter might not 4 and potentially
providing critical damage details unknown to FEMA.2 s
Second, compared to previous disaster victims, Katrina survivors are
disproportionately low-income and elderly26 - a function, to be sure, of the
Gulf Coast's particular demographics, but also a reflection of those most at risk
in major urban disasters. Without deprivation hearings, these survivors have
been unable to present their section 408 claims in the strongest light. This is
not to say, of course, that FEMA should always fashion its procedures to give
claimants the best chance of winning. This consideration merely suggests that
the current process, applied to certain high-risk demographic groups, is ill
suited for proper claim resolution. 7
Finally, there is a distinct dignity interest that should not be ignored. 8 The
immense stress placed on survivors as a consequence of unpredictable, and
sometimes erratic, agency behavior cuts in favor of providing deprivation
hearings before the government closes the door to what may be its most
fundamental post-disaster benefit. Though dignity concerns have long been
regarded as unprincipled or immeasurable,2 9 disaster situations should push
24. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 43
(1976) ("[A] face-to-face encounter with the claimant has a substantial positive correlation
with acceptance of the claim.").
25. Such a hearing would be particularly important if FEMA had conducted the inspection
without the applicant or her designated agent present. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
26. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 12; Mark Henderson, Katrina
Hit the Old ofAll Races, TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2006, at 33 ("The truly unique signature of
Katrina is the selectivity for the oldest members of the population . (quoting John
Mutter, deputy director of the Earth Institute)).
27. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (noting, in the welfare context, that
"[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the
educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional
assistance").
28. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES 675 (6th ed. 2006) (commenting that the objective of dignitary interests
"is for the claimant to feel that her interests have been recognized and respected and that
justice has been done").
2g. See Mashaw, supra note 24, at So ("The obvious difficulty with a dignitary theory of
procedural due process lies in defining operational limits on the procedural claims it
fosters."). But see Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C. Cir. 198o)
("[Plerhaps [the] most important reason for generally insisting upon a hearing is that no
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this soft variable to the forefront of procedural design. Indeed, maintaining the
dignity of survivors stands at the core of FEMA's stated mission, which
recognizes that the "emotional toll that disaster brings can sometimes be even
more devastating than the financial strains of damage and loss of home,
business, or personal property."30
Is FEMA capable of conducting deprivation hearings? History suggests as
much, given that the agency successfully constructed an identical process for
section 408 claimants before it quietly - and without comment - discarded the
procedure in 2002. ' FEMA is also capable of shouldering the additional cost of
deprivation hearings, particularly because not all disaster victims will request a
hearing32 and because the hearings themselves are unlikely to be time-
intensive. Additionally, the eighteen-month duration of section 408 benefits
will limit the opportunities to request a deprivation hearing, thereby reducing
the total cost to FEMA. Thus, like the housing program itself, deprivation
hearings will not be a permanent fixture in the federal budget.
Another familiar objection is that the fiscal burden of deprivation hearings,
however limited, might reduce the overall pool of money available to disaster
victims.33 Stated differently, might not deprivation hearings unwittingly
deprive survivors of much-needed assistance? In the traditional welfare
context, this argument carries considerable force. But disasters may be
different. Unlike welfare budgets, emergency budgets (backed by "do what it
takes" funding commitments) are highly flexible and not strictly capped,34
other procedure so effectively fosters a belief that one has been dealt with fairly, even if there
remains a disagreement with the result.").
3o. FEMA, Coping with Disaster, http://www.fema.gov/rebuild/recover/cope.shtm (last visited
Apr. 25, 2007).
31. See Temporary Housing Assistance for Emergencies and Major Disasters Declared on or
Before October 14, 2002, 44 C.F.R. § 2o6.1o1(m)(3)(ii)(E)(2) (20o6) (providing claimants
with, among other things, "basic safeguards of due process, including cross-examination of
the responsible official(s), access to the documents on which FEMA is relying, the right to
counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to a written decision").
32. Cf. David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual
Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1087-88 (2005) (discussing the food stamp program).
33. Cf. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[N]ew
layers of procedural protection may become an intolerable drain on the very funds
earmarked for food, clothing, and other living essentials.").
34. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Jim VandeHei, Bush To Request More Aid Funding: Analysts
Warn of Spending's Impact, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 20o5, at Ai (noting the Bush
Administration's belief that "the U.S. economy can safely absorb a sharp spike in spending
and budget deficits" and its willingness "to spend whatever it takes to rebuild the region and
help Katrina's victims get back on their feet").
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making concerns about budgetary tradeoffs less worrisome than they otherwise
would be.
III. DISASTER REPRESENTATION AND COST INTERNALIZATION: THE
CASE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
By itself, the addition of deprivation hearings likely will not do enough to
avoid erroneous section 4o8 denials.3" To make such hearings more effective,
and to respond to a severe but underappreciated structural deficiency, this Part
proposes the awarding of attorney's fees to successful section 4o8 appellants. A
fee-shifting provision would specifically address two kinds of problems -one
grounded in the post-disaster realities of available legal assistance, and one
stemming from concerns about agency decision-making.
Data gathered by the Government Accountability Office reveal a sharp
decline in the rate of post-Katrina section 4o8 appeals (9%) as compared to
appeal rates from previous disasters (23%).36 The most plausible explanation
for this troubling decline is a shortage of legal assistance to shepherd claimants
through the appeals process.37 Unlike in other markets for legal representation
that develop and adapt over time, disasters of Katrina's scope immediately
increase demand for already scarce legal services. 38 Providing attorney's fees
would mitigate this problem, incentivizing entry into the thinly stretched legal
assistance market and enhancing the informed vindication of rights.
Three concrete benefits would flow from compensating attorneys for
successful representation: (1) the quantity of appeals would increase as the
market for legal representation expanded; (2) the quality of appeals would
increase as attorneys, in the hopes of a fee award, would rationally sort
35. See, e.g., BREYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 672; Super, supra note 32, at io86 ("[T]he mere
possibility of a fair hearing is unlikely to influence an eligibility worker that otherwise would
have disregarded the program's rules.").
36. U.S. GOV'T AccouNTABuITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 18 tbl.3 (noting the decline from the
2003 hurricanes to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the percentage of applicants appealing
assistance decisions).
37. See, e.g., Hooks & Miller, supra note 6, at 36-37; see also BREYER ETAL., supra note 28, at 673
("The main factors [for low appeal rates] seem to be availability of legal representation and
socioeconomic background.").
38. See Super, supra note 32, at 1093-94 (noting limitations in access to legal representation for
public benefits claims); see also Hooks & Miller, supra note 6, at 36-37 (remarking that after
Katrina, "many remaining attorneys, hurricane survivors themselves, had lost their offices
and were unable to provide... services alone").
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meritorious cases from less promising ones;3" and (3) attorneys would be
encouraged to perform an investigatory role-uncovering factual evidence,
such as proof of property damage, insurance coverage, and occupancy, that
would be too financially onerous to seek out without the promise of fees.
Indeed, in the context of a section 408 appeal, such evidence has been critical in
correcting FEMA's mistakes.4
°
A fee provision would also improve the accuracy of agency decisions. An
additional cost that attached only as a result of successful appeals would
incentivize the agency to reduce its errors ex ante, rather than rely on the
administrative appeals process to catch its mistakes ex post.41 Under the
current system, FEMA externalizes the cost of erroneous denials; the survivors
bear the burden of the agency's mistakes. 42 The addition of fee shifting would
force the agency to internalize the cost of error. Consequently, the threat of fees
would sharpen the agency's approach to housing decisions, encouraging it to
move quickly to grant or deny benefits in clear cases and to focus more intently
on the close cases likely to generate appeals. 43
Might these altered incentives encourage FEMA to err in favor of the
survivor to avoid incurring the expense of an appeal and fee award? Perhaps. In
fact, this may be an unavoidable consequence of my proposal. But compared to
the individual survivor, FEMA (and society as a whole) is better suited to
absorb the cost of an erroneous determination. A measure of caution, even if
suboptimal in terms of efficiency, might in fact be a normatively preferable
result -particularly if one credits the view implicit in my argument that in
times of disaster, society should act as an insurer against the costs of agency
error.
44
39. This sorting effect would be weakened if attorneys bundled claims indiscriminately in the
hopes of winning the maximum number of appeals.
40. See Hooks & Miller, supra note 6, at 52; cf. Hurricane Katrina Project, supra note 17, at 26
(suggesting the importance of having on-the-ground evidence of agency error).
41. See, e.g., Super, supra note 32, at 1094 (commenting that attorney's fees can "deter[] some
unlawful behavior" in the administration of public benefits programs).
42. See, e.g., Erika Geetter, Comment, Attorney's Fees for 5 1983 Claims in Fair Hearings:
Rethinking Current Jurisprudence, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1267, 1290 (1988) ("[A]gencies have no
financial incentive to reduce the rate of error since no penalty is imposed for losing when a
decision is challenged.").
43. Cf BREYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 68o (noting that adjusting agency incentives "may do
more to cure administrative errors and promote consistency than an array of formal hearing
rights").
44. This conception of disaster exceptionalism reflects longstanding notions of enhanced
government duty after catastrophes. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson,
Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251
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To prevent this fee provision from blossoming into an unwieldy expense,
but to preserve its deterrent and representation-enhancing effect, all fees
should be crafted as flat, fixed payouts. Under this approach, FEMA would
retain a degree of control over the total impact of fee outlays on its budget; the
number of erroneous decisions would necessarily determine the amount it
would be forced to pay in attorney compensation. Indeed, this degree of
control is critical to maintain the deterrent impact of the award-if FEMA
wishes to pay less, it must be more careful in its eligibility decisions.4" At the
same time, because many section 408 claims are relatively simple and can be
handled concurrently, capping the fee (even at below-market rates) should not
dissuade attorneys from bundling individual cases to boost their
compensation .46 Thus, fees need not be large or unpredictable to produce their
intended effect.
CONCLUSION
For many survivors, the section 408 housing program represents a
transitional benefit, marking the boundary between continued insecurity and
personal stability following a disaster. FEMA's ineffective administration of the
program demands close attention and substantive change. This Comment has
offered two minimally invasive reforms to the section 408 program that can
safeguard the interests of survivors while improving agency performance.
Given the myriad difficulties FEMA has faced, the ideas presented here by no
means represent the only options worthy of consideration. But by focusing on
procedural design, my proposal offers a remedy that addresses issues of
(2003); Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and "Natural" Disaster Relief. Narrating the
American Welfare State, 33 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 257 (1999).
45. In the environmental law context, some commentators have suggested that asymmetric
attorney's fee awards in federal litigation can lead to inefficient agency expenditures due to
protracted litigation. See, e.g., Chad Settle et al., Citizen Suits, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 217, 245 (Anthony Heyes ed., 2001); see also Rosemary O'Leary, The
Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 562 (1989) (noting that the EPA spent 150 staff
work-years contesting a claim that was projected to prevent one cancer death every thirteen
years).
46. I hasten to caution that setting this fee too low will likely drain the proposal of its
usefulness, both in terms of adequately stimulating the legal assistance market and in terms
of generating quality representation for victims. Cf Robert R Rigg, The Constitution,
Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (1999) ("[E]xperience
leads one to conclude that the quality of the representation a client receives is inexorably
intertwined with the level of compensation the lawyer receives.").
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practical implementation often lost in larger structural debates. 47 It thus rejects
both the unacceptable status quo and the equally unattractive (but oft-
mentioned) option of dismantling the agency.48 The result is an approach that
strives to ensure that future survivors will not have to endure "Hurricane
FEMA" 49 : the administrative disaster that, so far, has characterized the
agency's emergency housing stewardship.
DAMIAN WILLIAMS
47. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 681 (" [T] here do not appear to be large political rewards
from improving administration.").
48. See, e.g., COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109-322, at 607 (2006) (proposing "to abolish
FEMA and build a stronger, more capable structure within [the Department of Homeland
Security]").
49- Peter Whoriskey, "We Called It Hurricane FEMA": Trailer Park Was Hastily Emptied, WASH.
POST, Mar. 12, 2007, at At.
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